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TERMS OF INCLUSION: UNITY AND DIVERSITY IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 
Harvey Kantor  
Department of Education, Culture, and Society 
University of Utah 
Robert Lowe 
Department of Educational Policy and Leadership 
Marquette University 
Abstract 
In this review essay, Harvey Kantor and Robert Lowe explore the history of the culture wars in public education 
in the United States. Drawing on three books — David Tyack’s Seeking Common Ground, Jonathan 
Zimmerman’s Whose America? and Amy Binder’s Contentious Curricula— Kantor and Lowe review the history of 
struggles over the content of history texts and over the place of religion and religious values in the classroom. 
They suggest that while these struggles have been partially successful in freeing public education from the racial 
and ethno-religious particularisms that informed its origins, the more inclusive curriculum that resulted from 
these efforts has been rendered largely symbolic by the persistence of segregation and the inequality of 
resources that accompanies it. 
From A Nation at Risk (1983) to the No Child Left Behind Act (2002) and the controversies that law has spawned, 
policy talk in education has concentrated on standards, assessment, accountability, and the potential of 
education to contribute to the nation’s economic competitiveness. For all the attention these issues have 
drawn, however, they have not been the only ones to trouble the educational waters over the last two decades. 
While national policy makers have focused on and argued about how to translate their belief in the school’s 
potential to develop human capital into concrete educational policies, many state and local school districts have 
wrestled with an equally, if not more, controversial set of issues having to do with the social and cultural 
purposes of public education. Foremost among these issues have been concerns about national identity, 
historical interpretation, and religious values. In fact, some of the most heated and intractable conflicts in recent 
years have had less to do with how to boost academic achievement than with whose version of the past should 
be taught to the nation’s school children and with the appropriate place of evolution, prayer, and faith-based 
instruction in the school curriculum. 
Conventional wisdom typically traces the origins of these culture wars to the social upheavals of the 1960s. 
Before then, according to this way of thinking, Americans generally agreed about the meaning of the nation’s 
history as well as about religion’s proper place in the school curriculum. In the 1960s, however, this apparent 
consensus began to fall apart. It was challenged on the left most prominently by people of color who resented, 
in David Hollinger’s words, the “narrowness of the prevailing culture” and advocated a more culturally inclusive 
version of the nation’s past,1 and it was challenged on the right by Christian fundamentalists who wanted to 
restore prayer and Bible reading to a prominent place in the school day and to teach creationism in place of or 
alongside evolution in the classroom.2 
Like much conventional wisdom, this way of thinking is not entirely wrong. The 1960s did constitute a cultural 
and educational turning point of sorts in recent American history. Nonetheless, claims about a time prior to the 
1960s when Americans agreed about the purposes of history instruction in the schools or about the role of 
religious values in public education — what Joseph Moreau has called the “1960s-as-pivot theory”— are 
misleading, for the history of religious and historical conflict in American education begins long before 
then.3 Though there was indeed a certain homogeneity to history textbooks in the 1950s, and Americans in the 
decades after the Scopes trial did appear to have reached a satisfactory compromise about the place of prayer 
and faith-based instruction in the schools, conflict about the appropriateness of religious expression in the 
classroom and about the purposes of history instruction are hardly unique to the past four decades. As those 
with at least a passing familiarity with the history of American education are aware, long before the social 
upheavals of the 1960s, Americans fought with one another about such things as the biases they believed 
permeated school history texts and which version of the Bible should be read in the classroom, or whether Bible 
reading should be permitted at all. 
Until recently, historians of education have paid minimal attention to these cultural conflicts, focusing instead 
on topics such as the meaning of progressive education, the expansion of secondary schooling and the rise of 
vocational education, and the politics of school desegregation and community control. Examining past and 
present conflicts over the content of history instruction and the place of religion in the schools can tell us a great 
deal, however, about the broader politics of inclusion within public education and the role that different groups 
of Americans have expected public schools to play in determining who counts in defining the nation’s social and 
cultural norms. It is a way, in short, of getting at the extent to which the identities and values of the diverse 
groups that make up American society have been included in what Hollinger has called the “circle of the we”— 
or, to put it slightly differently, where the boundaries defining the nation’s cultural heritage have been drawn 
and who has had the power to draw them.4 In overlapping ways, important recent studies by David Tyack, 
Jonathan Zimmerman, and Amy Binder advance this project. 
Common schools 
Of these books, David Tyack’s Seeking Common Ground: Public Schools in a Diverse Society casts the widest 
net.5 Organized around the themes of unity, diversity, and democracy, the book ranges across the landscape of 
educational history. Among other things, it describes the quest for a common denominator of political and 
moral truths that informed the creation of the common schools; discusses the various ways in which educators 
have dealt with questions of social and educational diversity, focusing in particular on issues of race, 
immigration and ethnicity, gender, and academic failure; and examines questions of educational governance, 
including an analysis of the struggle between democratic localism and bureaucratic centralism, as well as the 
history of private alternatives to public education with specific reference to current debates over vouchers and 
school choice. He looks at these in terms of two competing educational ideals: securing common values and 
respecting cultural differences, with an emphasis on how political leaders and school officials since the late 
eighteenth century have sought to use public education to create civic cohesion while recognizing the ethnic and 
religious differences of the various groups that have made up American society. 
As Amy Gutmann has observed, this problem typically has evoked two kinds of responses.6 One sets the civic 
mission of the schools against the diversifying tendencies of pluralism or multiculturalism; the other puts the 
claims of cultural diversity above the schools’ civic aims. Tyack rejects both of these positions, arguing that the 
history of these competing aims in the public schools is better understood as a story of persistent contradictions 
and conflicts of values — what he sees as inevitable tensions — that need to be renegotiated from one 
generation to the next. 
The foundation of the book is its first chapter on the republican charter for public education and the origins of 
the common school. Here, Tyack lays out the belief of Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Rush, and Noah Webster that 
a uniform public education would integrate the polity, and he describes the efforts of Horace Mann, Calvin 
Stowe, and others to set up common schools where citizens from all backgrounds might come together to 
discover common civic values and, when they disagreed, to seek principled compromise. Though overshadowed 
in the twentieth century by the rise of vocationalism and, most recently, by our preoccupation with academic 
standards, assessment, and accountability, that vision still animates many today who continue to see public 
education as a unique civic space where citizens can negotiate a sense of shared purpose or find ways to discuss 
and accommodate their differences. 
Tyack himself is partial to this vision. Like Jefferson and Mann, he believes that the nation’s civic religion, 
institutionalized in its commitment to public education, is sufficiently capacious to accommodate its racial and 
ethnic diversity. But the history he recounts tells a more sobering story. A “partisan” of the public schools, but a 
“critical” one (SCG, 182), he points out that from the outset this ideal has not always been realized in practice — 
that racism, ethnocentrism, and religious intolerance have frequently eclipsed consensus and reasoned debate. 
Indeed, from this perspective, where Tyack sees tensions, contradictions, and dilemmas in the search for 
common ground, one less sympathetic to the public education enterprise might argue that the search for 
common ground has largely been a story of exclusion, coercion, and unequal treatment. 
Part of the problem is that the search for common ground has often turned the school into what Tyack, 
following Willard Waller, calls “‘a museum of virtue,’ an institution disconnected from everyday life” (SCG, 36). 
This was most notably the case when Horace Mann advised that teachers should simply skip over politically 
controversial texts in order not to alienate any group from the public schools, though this is hardly the only 
instance where the search for a politically neutral common denominator threatened to water down the content 
of the curriculum to the point that it lacked any real substance or meaning. Drawing on Jonathan Zimmerman’s 
work as well as his own, Tyack points out that various groups’ efforts to challenge the content of history 
textbooks during the twentieth century has had much the same effect — resulting in a banal “Americans All” 
approach to the past that belies the kind of critically educated citizenry necessary for a democratic republic to 
thrive. 
While maintaining his faith in the ideal of unity, Tyack recognizes that in practice this ideal has had other limits 
as well. One is simply that it often did not extend far enough. It stretched to include the assimilation of 
European immigrants, who were classified as white, but it typically excluded or segregated African Americans 
and, in many cases, Mexican Americans and Asian Americans. At the same time, however, Tyack points out that 
inclusion by itself did not inevitably lead to respect for cultural differences, but often served the interests of the 
white, male, Protestant educational leaders who defined its meaning. This was the case with Irish Catholics in 
the mid-nineteenth century who sought to have public funds channeled to the parochial schools they controlled 
because they considered Mann’s ideology of nonsectarian virtue to be anti-Catholic. It was also the case with 
much of what passed in the early years of the twentieth century for Americanization, which, Tyack observes, not 
only justified the provision of much-needed social services to the poor and foreign-born but more often than not 
defined good citizenship to mean the acceptance of middle-class values and norms of behavior rather than 
participation in politics or other ways of exercising one’s constitutional rights. 
On the other hand, Tyack recognizes that the acknowledgment of diversity and difference did not always have 
positive consequences either. He argues that within the institutional structure of the school, the recognition of 
diversity frequently meant hierarchy and inequality rather than valuing difference. In a first-rate chapter on how 
schools have dealt with academic failure, for example, he shows that while differences in academic performance 
always have been a part of school life, the labels educators have used to identify those who have not succeeded 
academically have stigmatized individuals along with the immigrant groups and populations of color from which 
these students disproportionately came. Viewed as innately inadequate or culturally deprived in the twentieth 
century, struggling students found themselves in low tracks or compensatory education, generally receiving the 
worst opportunities for intellectual growth in an increasingly differentiated curriculum. Nonetheless, Tyack is 
skeptical of the recent movement for standards-based reform, and he points out that simply treating all 
students the same without first equalizing the resources they need to reach the levels expected of them is no 
guarantee of more just results. 
Tyack argues that no single system of school governance has been able to resolve these contradictions and 
tensions. Administrative progressives in the early twentieth century thought a centralized, professionally run 
system of governance preferable to the decentralized system of lay control that was the building block of 
democratic school governance in the nineteenth century, largely because they equated lay control not with 
democracy but with corruption and incompetence. Centralization, however, also meant bureaucratic control at 
the expense of popular input, and in the 1960s it came under assault from African Americans, Latinos, and 
others disenfranchised by it. Some argued for radical decentralization instead, while others appealed to the 
courts and federal government to secure rights long denied them at the local level. But Tyack argues that 
neither strategy succeeded in creating a more democratic form of school governance. Rather, the result has 
been a more elaborate but less coordinated bureaucracy — what, following John Meyer, he calls a “fragmented 
form of centralization”— characterized more by the appearance than the reality of democratic control. 
To what degree should school governance be centralized? Should professionals or lay people run the schools? In 
the end, Tyack argues that these questions admit of no easy answers but are as intractable as the other tensions 
between diversity and commonality he describes throughout his book. Whether control should be centralized or 
decentralized, whether decisions should be made by parents or professionally trained educators, he says, 
ultimately depends on the issue at hand. Some of the most important tasks of governance — such as enlisting 
parental involvement in schools — can best be done at the local level, but more centralized action has been 
necessary to protect civil rights and to remedy inequities in the resources available to states and local districts. 
All things being equal, however, his preferred form of governance is the kind of local control that characterized 
the nineteenth-century rural school where he says both adults and young people came together to deliberate 
“about common needs and values in a face-to-face-community” (SCG, 185). 
Discomforted by these seemingly intractable tensions, some today argue that public schools — or what their 
critics sometimes refer to as “government schools”— have failed and that they should be replaced by an open 
market in which parents can choose either public or private education for their children. Tyack is somewhat 
sympathetic to parts of this argument. Although he rejects the metaphor of consumer choice that many voucher 
advocates use, he acknowledges that Catholics and some conservative Protestant sects have long organized 
private schools around legitimate differences of culture and conscience. He also concedes that public school 
choice might provide a much needed “jolt” that would loosen the “bureaucratic gridlock” so characteristic of 
many urban schools today (SCG, 178). In the end, however, he argues that private school choice is neither a 
panacea nor an ideal. This is partly because he doubts that vouchers will lead to an improvement in academic 
quality, though that is not his main objection. More importantly, he argues that whether or not private schools 
do a better job of imparting academic skills, public schools have occupied a special place in American civic life 
and that transforming what historically has been a democratic forum for communities to make collective 
decisions about how to educate the next generation into matters of individual, private choice would greatly 
impoverish it. 
Tyack is not, of course, the only one to fear that the current movement to privatize public spaces like schools 
poses a threat to social solidarity and civic life. We, too, share this concern. At the same time, however, Tyack’s 
argument too easily slides over the tensions and contradictions that his book documents. He intends to show 
that tensions are an inevitable part of public education in a diverse society and that public schools constitute a 
unique space where those tensions can be debated and accommodated. In doing so, he hopes to dispel the 
notion that the civic purposes of public education are necessarily incompatible with a commitment to diversity. 
But eager to defend public education from the threat of privatization, he does not fully consider the degree to 
which the racism and ethnocentrism his book illustrates were not just incidental to the common school or an 
unfortunate lapse from its better impulses but were, in fact, integral to its origins and fundamental to its 
eventual success. 
Nothing illustrates this better than Tyack’s account of Horace Mann’s rebuke to the principal of a teacher 
training school for taking his students to an abolitionist meeting. An abolitionist himself, Mann nonetheless 
justified this rebuke because he feared that anything so controversial might jeopardize popular support for the 
common school by driving away its (white) patrons. For Mann and other advocates of the common school who 
worried about its political future, this was undoubtedly a legitimate concern. But by honoring the prejudices of 
whites at the expense of Black equality, it reveals how much the success of the common school depended in 
practice precisely on the fact that African Americans and other people of color were either excluded from it or 
included but segregated within it.7 
This does not mean that Tyack’s belief in public education as an instrument of the common good is misplaced. 
He is surely right that the ideology of the common school has been used for democratic purposes, particularly to 
legitimate the claims of African Americans and other disenfranchised groups for inclusion in the nation’s civic 
and educational life, and that its loss would impoverish American democracy.8 But the notion that the common 
school functioned as a place where people from all walks of life could come together to talk out their 
differences, or learn democracy by practicing it, is difficult to sustain once we recognize that in practice that 
ideal usually worked best in places where the circle of the we was drawn to include only those who shared the 
Anglo, Protestant, and capitalist values that motivated Mann and the other advocates of the common school in 
the first place — or, to put it differently, where those of different races or with different cultural or religious 
values were excluded from it.9 From this perspective, the question facing advocates of the public schools such as 
Tyack is not only whether a public system of education is preferable to a private one, but whether the search for 
common ground in education can be sufficiently dissociated from the ethno-religious particularisms that 
informed its origins and have long sustained it so that public education’s promise of equality and democracy for 
all citizens can be more fully realized. 
New voices/old stories 
Jonathan Zimmerman’s Whose America? Culture Wars in the Public Schools addresses this question about the 
search for common ground in public education.10 Like Tyack, he argues that conflict and disagreement are an 
inevitable part of public education in a diverse society. Zimmerman, however, offers a less sanguine assessment 
of what this search has produced. Framing his study not in terms of competing ideals, but in terms of competing 
interest groups, each trying to impose its view of the common good on the school curriculum, he argues that the 
outcome of these struggles has had significant consequences — that in the twentieth century the circle of the 
we in public education has proven to be more expansive than what Mann imagined — but even when these 
struggles stretched the boundaries of the common good to include more diverse voices, inclusion has seldom 
produced the kind of critical dialogue about different views that he thinks an education for living in a democratic 
society demands. 
The book tells two stories: one about conflicts over patriotism and history texts, the other about conflicts over 
religion and religious values, specifically school prayer and sex education. Both of these stories speak to 
questions about the terms of inclusion in U.S. schools, but they diverge in important respects. The main 
argument of the book is that whereas the history wars have been chiefly about who gets included in the national 
story rather than whether another story is more appropriate, conflicts over religion have reflected 
fundamentally contrasting views of morality and the place of religious belief in public life. As a result, according 
to Zimmerman, these conflicts have not only been less amenable to resolution in what he calls “the additive 
come-one-come-all fashion” that characterized the nation’s history wars, but they have been more persistent 
and more contentious as well (WA, 6). 
The first part of the book focuses on debates over patriotism and the content of school history texts. Some of 
the ground Zimmerman covers here is familiar, such as his account of the right-wing attack on the New Deal that 
led to the American Legion’s ultimately successful campaign to discredit Harold Rugg’s series of left-leaning 
social studies textbooks. Other episodes described in the book are less well known, though not entirely 
unfamiliar. These include chapters on the “history wars” of the 1920s, when various immigrant groups protested 
their depiction in history textbooks, and patriotic societies such as the Daughters of the American Revolution 
decried new texts that they believed slighted the nation’s Revolutionary War heroes; the conflict between 
southerners and northern textbook companies over the treatment of the South in history texts, as neo-
Confederate groups contested what they claimed was the pro-Northern bias in textbook accounts of slavery, the 
Civil War, and Reconstruction; and the century-long campaign of African Americans to remove racist slurs from 
textbooks and to highlight the place of African Americans in U.S. history, focusing in one chapter on Carter G. 
Woodson’s efforts to add Black history courses to the school curriculum in the 1920s and in a later chapter on 
the demands of the Civil Rights Movement and Black student activists in the 1960s and the early 1970s for 
courses in African American history and literature. 
If this is not previously uncharted territory, Zimmerman offers some novel descriptions of the politics 
surrounding these episodes, documenting several examples of alliances that confound the typical divisions of 
left and right. Here, as he has elsewhere, Zimmerman highlights the position of several immigrant organizations 
that found themselves in strange territory when they joined with nativists to attack David Muzzey’s text, An 
American History, because they believed its portrayal of the American Revolution was biased toward England 
and therefore diminished their own special role in the founding of the republic.11 In another case of unorthodox 
political company, the National Association of Manufacturers unsurprisingly joined with the American Legion in 
the late 1930s to excoriate Rugg’s Building America textbook series for undermining the principles of 
individualism and free enterprise. In the 1950s, however, it unexpectedly reversed its position and joined with 
the public school officials it had once scorned to thwart similar right-wing attacks on the schools out of concern 
that the association might suffer a negative backlash due to popular opposition to these attacks. In addition, 
when some African Americans in the 1960s objected to texts that portrayed them as victims of poverty and 
racial oppression and demanded separate Black history courses that stressed the positive aspects of their 
cultural and racial heritage, they found themselves odd bedfellows with conservative whites who protested the 
inclusion of images of impoverished African Americans because they believed that dwelling on the negative 
effects of racism denigrated the nation’s history. 
No one who reads Zimmerman’s account of these conflicts is likely to conclude that disagreements over 
portrayals of the nation’s past are unique to our own time. But Zimmerman cautions that we should not mistake 
contentiousness for disagreement over fundamentals. To the contrary, he argues, the real issue in these 
disputes was seldom whether a different story was needed but whether all would feel included in the traditional 
one. Consequently, even though texts became more diverse, they seldom raised questions about the justice of 
American society or about the beliefs and behaviors of its traditional heroes. Rather, despite the warnings of 
those who feared that the inclusion of racial and ethnic minorities would erode the nation’s “majestic national 
narrative” (WA, 6), Zimmerman argues that the inclusion of more diverse voices in history textbooks almost 
always wound up reinforcing it — that far from disrupting the traditional story line, the infusion of diversity was 
in fact compatible with it. 
This is a compelling and provocative story. It surely complicates our understanding of the history of the cultural 
politics of education. Largely absent from Zimmerman’s account, however, is an acknowledgment of the ways 
race, class, and power influenced the expression of the diverse voices history texts have come to include. As a 
result, despite the care with which Whose America? details the viewpoints of different groups on the various 
curricular conflicts it describes, Zimmerman draws conclusions about them that do not always seem warranted. 
This is especially evident in his treatment of immigrants and African Americans. His account of the role European 
immigrant groups played in the history wars in the 1920s, for example, makes plain that immigrants themselves 
seldom asked for a more critical rendering of the nation’s history. In telling this story, however, nowhere does 
Zimmerman consider the ways in which war-time campaigns for “one hundred percent Americanism,” passage 
of the 1921 and 1924 immigration restriction acts, and the government-backed suppression of syndicalist and 
other radical groups, not to mention the Progressive era rhetoric that promised the poor and foreign-born social 
and economic mobility, may have influenced how certain immigrant groups viewed the school curriculum or 
their capacity to influence it.12 As a result, he seems to imply that the various positions they took exclusively 
reflected their willing consent to the language and logic of the nation’s civic tradition. Yet given the historical 
context in which they operated, the fact that immigrant groups endorsed a nationalistic rendering of their role in 
American history is perhaps better seen not only as a product of their own volition but also as a reaction to 
more coercive measures that silenced radical immigrant voices and that narrowed the range of culturally and 
politically acceptable behaviors open to comparatively mainstream immigrant groups as well.13 
A lack of context is also evident in Zimmerman’s discussion of protests against traditional textbooks by African 
Americans, especially in his account of the battle over Black history in the 1960s. Though he is hardly 
unsympathetic to African American demands for curricular justice, his account is critical of Black students for 
pushing a separatist textbook agenda, since he believes this relieved pressure on the school system to integrate 
its regular history texts and fostered an uncritical, celebratory rendering of the Black role in American history. In 
this analysis, however, he does not think much about the way the long history of ill treatment in white schools 
shaped how Black students viewed the curricular choices they believed were open to them, including their 
doubts that white teachers could be trusted to teach Black history in a way that did not diminish or distort the 
role of African Americans in the nation’s story.14 Absent attention to these matters, his account seems to imply 
that the choices students made were chiefly a product of a misguided ideology when they might be better 
understood as a strategically thought out reaction to the historical and institutional context in which they found 
themselves. 
The version of inclusion that characterized history texts was not simply shaped by broad contexts, however. It 
also traced significantly to direct opposition to curricular content that was not overtly celebratory. In fact, for all 
his efforts to complicate the political history of school history texts, much of Zimmerman’s own evidence 
suggests that the terms of inclusion in the nation’s master narrative reflected not only the preferences of 
workers, immigrants, and people of color themselves, but the wishes of more powerful whites, elites, and 
patriotic societies who rallied periodically to keep out the views they found most objectionable. 
The most obvious example of this opposition is the campaign to eliminate Rugg’s social studies texts. These texts 
not only articulated a broad view of American identity that welcomed cultural diversity, but they adopted an 
expansive definition of citizenship and a left-liberal view of the economy that praised the New Deal and 
questioned the sanctity of private property, all of which made them a target of conservatives in the Hearst 
press, various business associations, and patriotic societies like the American Legion. Led by the Legion, the 
National Association of Manufacturers, and the Advertising Federation of America, these groups mounted a 
systematic campaign that stirred up popular opposition to the books’ liberal point of view and effectively 
destroyed the market for them. Once used in more than 4,000 school systems, by the end of the 1940s they had 
been removed from public school classrooms altogether. 
As Zimmerman points out, these attacks on Rugg’s books were singularly successful. Subsequently, during the 
1950s, when McCarthyism inspired a new round of attacks to stamp out any remnants of collectivism in history 
texts, this campaign seldom resonated except in the South. Even business repudiated it. But this hardly meant 
that businessmen abandoned their efforts to use the schools to build support for capitalism and the free 
enterprise system. Rather, as Elisabeth Fones-Wolf has shown, except for a few who argued that school officials 
were sympathetic to communism and endeavored to remove them, most businessmen now sought to dispel any 
lingering New Deal influence on the curriculum not by attacking the schools but by promoting curricula 
sympathetic to business and free enterprise instead.15 
Equally important was the long history of white opposition to the Black demand for an honest confrontation 
with the role of race and racism in the nation’s history. As Zimmerman points out, this opposition was most 
pronounced in the South, where southern white women in the United Daughters of the Confederacy policed an 
“unyielding sectional orthodoxy in southern white textbooks”(WA, 34), particularly around the portrayal of 
slavery, the Civil War, and Reconstruction. But white opposition was also widespread in the North, where for the 
first half of the twentieth century widely used texts like Muzzey’s reflected the negotiated settlement of 
sectional differences in which the South acknowledged that secession was unconstitutional while the North 
muted its criticism of slavery and intensified its condemnation of Black misrule during Reconstruction.16 
To the extent that the history wars were resolvable by reducing the complexity of the nation’s past, then, it was 
not due simply to the fact that all groups wanted nothing more than to have their own heroes sung. Rather, it 
reflected the way in which historical and social constraints shaped how different groups viewed the schools and 
their capacity to influence them, on the one hand, and the power of patriotic societies, business leaders, and 
other conservative whites to establish the terms of inclusion acceptable to them, on the other. Indeed, viewed 
from this perspective, what is most interesting about the textbook wars is not that diversity has been more 
compatible with the ideological mainstream than is commonly supposed, but that the price of inclusion often 
was the exclusion or modification of views that implied anything else. 
Yet if elites succeeded in eliminating the views most objectionable to them, they did not always get everything 
they wanted either. As Joseph Moreau has pointed out in his recent study of the evolution of school history 
texts and as Frances Fitzgerald noted in her earlier book, America Revised, not only have texts changed 
sufficiently to trouble those who value a unified national narrative, but these changes have in some instances 
been accompanied by shifts in perspective as well.17 This is most notably the case in the way in which 
Reconstruction has been represented, as the long-held negative view of this period was turned completely on its 
head. Such shifts in perspective have been less common the closer the texts come to the present — in particular, 
according to Moreau, even progressive texts remain uncertain about how to deal with questions of class and 
economic inequality and continue to obscure the sources of racial injustice and who benefited from it — but 
both Moreau and Fitzgerald leave little doubt that their inclusiveness significantly departs from the past. No one 
who reads them could conclude that immigrants, African Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans have not 
been part of American history. 
None of this means that Zimmerman is necessarily wrong in his conclusions. Not only did many of these changes 
only become evident in the 1970s and 1980s whereas Zimmerman’s research essentially ends in the late 1960s, 
but neither Moreau nor Fitzgerald maintains that the inclusion of white immigrants in the 1930s and 1940s and 
the more recent inclusion of African Americans, as well as Latinos, Native Americans, and other historically 
marginalized groups, has produced a radically revised rendering of the nation’s past. Nonetheless, this pattern 
of change without disrupting the status quo becomes more understandable if we see the struggles over texts 
not, as Zimmerman’s analysis suggests, as a story of pluralist bargaining in which all groups got to have their 
heroes sung, but as a conflict-ridden struggle of resistance and accommodation in which immigrants, African 
Americans, and other marginalized groups tried to force their way into the nation’s master narrative (sometimes 
altering parts of it) while those in power fought to set the terms of inclusion acceptable to them. 
Irreconcilable differences 
However one evaluates the content of United States history texts, their increasing inclusiveness, according to 
Zimmerman, contrasts with the apparent incapacity of public education to include religious values. In the second 
part of Whose America? he turns to the political history of these conflicts, focusing on controversies about 
religious instruction, school prayer, and sex education from the 1940s to the 1960s and beyond. This part of the 
book begins by describing the system — widespread in the 1940s and 1950s — of release-time instruction, 
which made religious education available on an optional basis after school or in church-sponsored classes during 
the school day. Subsequently, it traces the controversy sparked by the Supreme Court decisions in 1962 and 
1963 banning Bible reading and school prayer. Fearful of undermining the Court’s authority on desegregation by 
opposing these decisions, many liberal Protestants subsequently ceded the arena of religious education to 
conservatives and fundamentalist Christians who not only continued to press their claims on the schools but 
revived the notion (alive and well today) of a Christian America in which schools, as well as other public 
institutions, should conduct their business in accordance with the biblical injunction to worship God. This 
section’s final chapter on sex education explores the campaign of doctors, psychologists, and other self-
proclaimed “sexperts” in groups such as the Sex Information and Education Council of the United States (SIECUS) 
to add sex education to the school curriculum, and it documents the hostile reaction their efforts provoked from 
parent groups who believed that sex education constituted an unwarranted intrusion into the rights of the 
family and from religious conservatives who believed that sex education would encourage teenage sexual 
experimentation and thereby violate the biblical admonishment against sex outside marriage. 
These battles over religion also produced their share of odd political alliances. One of the most unfamiliar 
political arrangements was the alliance between some segments of the African American community and 
conservative white Protestants in the South in opposition to the Court’s rulings on Bible reading and school 
prayer. Zimmerman points to one protest in Jackson, Mississippi, for example, where Black and white students 
marched together — behind a Black principal — in support of their shared belief that “believers should be ‘free’ 
to pray” in school (WA, 219). Equally transgressive of familiar political alignments was the alliance formed 
between Catholics and fundamentalist Protestants, long hostile to one another on school matters but united in 
their opposition to the kind of ecumenical religious curriculum that some northern school districts sought to 
institute in the 1950s. 
If these kinds of alliances made possible the resolution of disputes over the content of history texts, however, 
Zimmerman argues that this has seldom been the case with religion. There is some evidence, he acknowledges, 
that Christian evangelicals today have “donned the mantle of cultural pluralism,” asking not for the exclusion of 
other views but for “equal time” for theirs (WA, 223). This is particularly evident in battles over sex education, 
where Christian conservatives have shifted ground in recent years, asking that “abstinence” be taught in 
addition to “information” rather than in place of it. For the most part, however, this second story is not one of 
compromise and accommodation but one of irreconcilable differences. Zimmerman argues that in contrast to 
the history wars, in which all groups shared a commitment to the nation’s civic tradition, the religious wars have 
reflected Americans’ fundamentally contrasting views about morality and the place of religious faith in public 
life, making them singularly resistant to compromise. 
Zimmerman is not entirely certain what to make of the culture wars, as he frankly acknowledges. On the one 
hand, he is dismayed by the kind of uncritical, banal texts that have resulted from the system of pluralist 
bargaining that has characterized the nation’s history wars. At the same time, however, he is troubled by the 
very lack of such accommodation in the nation’s religious conflicts. To resolve this dilemma, he argues for a 
more dialogical approach in American classrooms that practices greater tolerance of religion and religious 
difference so that schools might seriously examine different religious perspectives but that rejects “the daily 
catechism in the virtues of America and its diverse groups,” including school prayer, since by its very nature 
prayer commits students to a certain worldview (WA, 224). But if religious commitment is necessarily 
uncompromisable, it is not clear why his proposal will appeal to evangelicals today any more than he says it did 
in the past, or why the inclusion of different religious views would not lead, at best, to the same kind of outcome 
that the inclusion of diverse voices did in the history curriculum, which he deplores. 
The source of this uncertainty is understandable. Today’s disputes over school prayer and Bible reading in the 
classroom do indeed seem especially contentious and irresolvable. Nonetheless, he perhaps overstates the 
differences between the history wars and the religious wars by inadequately considering, to borrow John Rury’s 
phrase, “the ebb and flow of conflict over time.”18 As his own account shows, for three decades after the Scopes 
trial, the tradition of local control, institutionalized in the system of release-time instruction, diminished these 
kinds of conflicts by accommodating the desire of those individuals and communities who wanted religious 
instruction in school without forcing it on others who did not. Rather than attribute our present situation to the 
inherently uncompromisable nature of religious belief, therefore, we might more appropriately ask what 
changed so that past arrangements such as the system of release-time were no longer able to satisfy them. 
No doubt part of the answer lies with the Supreme Court decisions in Engle v. Vitale (1962) and Abington v. 
Schemp (1963) banning school prayer and Bible reading. As Zimmerman and others point out, these decisions 
not only provoked an immediate outcry, they also provided a rallying point that mobilized evangelicals and 
contributed to the rise of the new Christian Right.19 But adverse Court decisions have not always produced such 
a reaction. In 1948, for example, the Court sought to circumscribe the system of release-time instruction, but it 
continued to grow despite the Court’s decision. What else, then, had changed by 1960s? In particular, if so many 
people still supported some form of religious instruction in the schools, why did school districts and state boards 
of education now seek to enforce the Court’s edicts rather than ignore or side-step them, as they had done 
before? Did their position reflect broader trends in the secularization and nationalization of American life, or did 
it perhaps represent a shift in the balance of power away from the proponents of religious instruction? Indeed, 
one of the most striking differences between the history wars and the religious wars is not that the former are 
inherently amenable to compromise while the latter are not, but that, in contrast to the history wars, those 
most aggrieved in the religious wars tend to come not from the most marginal but from the more advantaged 
sectors of American society. How and why did this happen? The answers to these questions are hardly simple, 
but absent more attention to them it is difficult to understand why the religious wars seem to have eclipsed the 
history wars in the cultural politics of education today without essentializing the differences between them. 
Terms of exclusion 
Like Whose America? Amy Binder’s Contentious Curricula: Afrocentrism and Creationism in American Public 
Schools is interested in the efforts of activists to shape the school curriculum.20 Yet, unlike Zimmerman, who 
focuses on the political struggles between different interest groups and the ideologies that motivated them, 
Binder focuses most of her book on the relation between these groups and the institutional context in which 
these conflicts took place. In doing so, she not only directs our attention to an aspect of the politics of cultural 
conflict in the schools that Zimmerman generally neglects — namely, the organizational structure of the schools 
and the professional commitments of educators themselves — but she also offers a different account of the 
forces that have shaped the schools’ search for common ground amid ethno-religious diversity. From Binder’s 
perspective, that search has been shaped not merely by competing ideals or by the struggle between different 
interest groups battling with each other to impose their preferences on the curriculum, but by the way 
institutional and professional norms shaped educators’ response to groups who challenged them. 
Based on seven case studies of controversies that took place between 1980 and 2000, Binder examines the fate 
of two challenges to the school system from groups at different ends of the political and cultural spectrum: 
three cases where Afrocentrists sought to rewrite the history and social studies curriculum to center the 
experience of Africans and African Americans, and four cases where conservative Christians sought to have 
creationism taught alongside evolution in the study of human origins in science classrooms. Ostensibly different, 
Binder argues that both groups actually had much in common. Both criticized the school system for imposing its 
values on their children, both used the “emotive force of their children’s welfare” to make their case for 
curriculum change, and both insisted that “their corrective to the education establishment’s monopoly on the 
curriculum was to provide pluralism in the classroom” (CC, 3–4). The most important similarity between them, 
however, was that both ultimately failed. In the end, neither had a lasting or widespread effect on the content 
of the curriculum or on students’ classroom learning. In the three Afrocentric cases — which occurred in Atlanta, 
Washington, D.C., and New York state — Afrocentrism disappeared into the minimalist version of 
multiculturalism that has become an institutionalized “given” in the nation’s urban classrooms (CC, 23), while in 
the four creationist cases — in Louisiana, California, Kansas, and Vista, California — creationism was rejected 
altogether. 
Binder’s book is devoted to understanding the reasons for these failures. She builds her argument on social 
movement theory, which stresses the efforts of protest groups, particularly their capacity to mobilize financial 
and ideological resources. For two reasons, however, she argues that social movement theory is inadequate to 
account for the outcome of the challenges she studied. One is that these challenges did not break down neatly 
into “organizational insiders” and “challenging outsiders,” as social movement theory postulates. Rather, in 
some cases, protestors found allies inside the educational system, as happened in Atlanta when a newly 
appointed superintendent made common cause with a local parent group to pressure others in the school 
system to adopt an Afrocentric curriculum. The second is that access to political power — the key variable in 
social movement research — did not guarantee success. In Vista, California, and Kansas, for example, pro-
creationist majorities were elected to the school board, while in Louisiana both houses of the state legislature 
approved a resolution mandating “equal time” for creationism and evolution, but those victories had little 
impact on what students were taught in school. 
What accounts for these failures? Binder maintains that in order to understand them, we must look beyond the 
efforts of protest groups themselves. Rather, she argues that it is more important to look at the organizational 
dynamics, structures, and beliefs these groups confronted when they made their claims on the schools. Among 
other things, these include the fragmented organization of the schools, which limited the opportunities for 
unified decision making, and, even more importantly, the institutional norms and values — what she calls the 
“institutional scripts” (CC, 22) — of local educators and the larger education profession of which they are a part, 
particularly their beliefs about what constitutes “reasonable instruction” (CC, 237). Lacking a unitary form of 
decision making and wedded to these beliefs, she argues, educators in all seven cases fought to preserve their 
core instructional practices, eventually rebuffing those challenging these practices, even where Afrocentrists 
were able to win the support of some organizational insiders and where creationists won a measure of political 
power. In Binder’s view, in short, more than any shortcomings of social activists and their strategies, it is the 
institutional culture of schooling itself and professional educators’ institutional power that sets the terms of 
inclusion and exclusion, and unless we take these things into account we cannot begin to understand why 
neither group was able to make “lasting, concerted change in the school systems they challenged” (CC, 6). 
This is not Binder’s entire story, however. She argues that for institutional reasons educators also relied on 
different strategies to fend off each challenge. Most school officials were threatened by both movements and 
wished that they had never been formed. But because of its focus on the poor treatment African American 
children have typically received in public schools and its use of the rhetoric of discrimination and racial injustice, 
Afrocentrism resonated more with the established culture of the schools than creationism, since the latter had 
to overcome the objection that it was unconstitutional as well as the belief that historically Christians had been 
treated fairly by the educational system. Thus, despite their suspicions of it, educators considered Afrocentric 
demands a legitimate subject for discussion and allowed Afrocentric proposals for revised curricula on their 
official agenda — even temporarily making changes to their social studies curricula — only to water them down 
and ultimately reject them later. By contrast, when confronted by creationists, they made no initial 
accommodation at all, but rallied organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union and the National Academy 
of Sciences to resist them from the start. 
Binder’s argument about the importance of organizational dynamics and institutional power reorients social 
movement theory, which has traditionally focused primarily on the balance of power between protest 
movements and the state. But her argument about the power of institutions to deflect outside challenges will 
not be especially surprising to students of educational reform. Among others, Tyack and Larry Cuban, as she 
notes, have long pointed to the capacity of the schools to absorb challenges while protecting their core 
functions.21 
What is more interesting is Binder’s argument that educators used a different set of institutional strategies to 
minimize each challenge, since it relates more specifically to questions raised by Zimmerman and Tyack about 
the search for commonality in public education and how the culture of the schools has shaped it. In particular, 
by highlighting the school’s common yet different strategies in responding to these challenges, Binder reinforces 
Zimmerman’s argument about how conflicts over history and religion have defined what constitutes common 
ground. At the same time, however, she points us in a different direction in the quest to explain the pattern 
Zimmerman describes. Instead of focusing on interest groups and the accommodations they made or examining 
the strategies and rhetoric of protest groups, she suggests that we look instead to the professional norms of 
educators and what they think is acceptable and what is not. Binder does not, however, show us how those 
norms developed or how and why they may have shifted over time. That, of course, is not the purpose of her 
book. But absent attention to these questions, it is difficult to know how or why points of view that once 
seemed objectionable are now accepted or, conversely, why policies that were once widespread now seem 
objectionable — or, to put this in Tyack’s terms, how the tensions between unity and diversity have been 
renegotiated over time. 
Consider, for example, Binder’s claim that educators in the schools she studied were at least willing to give 
Afrocentrism a hearing because its advocates’ arguments about Black underachievement and the persistence of 
white racism were validated by the established culture of the school. Today, these concerns do indeed seem to 
be institutional “givens,” as Binder points out. But, prior to the 1960s, that was hardly the case, at least not 
among white educators. To the contrary, Zimmerman’s account of the textbook wars makes clear that before 
then mainstream history texts used in most schools not only remained filled with racial slurs but apparently 
evoked no objections from the white teachers who used them, not just in the South but in the North as well. 
How, then, did the culture Binder describes become so established that few educators today question it? How, 
in short, were the boundaries of the circle of the we stretched to include these new concerns? We suspect that 
social movements had more to do with this than Binder’s institutional perspective allows. It would be hard to 
understand this shift in norms, for example, without considering the rise of the Civil Rights Movement in general 
and Black school movements in particular. But, whatever their relative impact, the main point here is that, in 
light of the way race historically has circumscribed the definition of the common good in public education, we 
need to know more about how educators were stretched to accommodate modest change while protecting the 
status quo. 
In the end, however, the most interesting aspect of Binder’s book may be what the contrast between 
Afrocentrism and creationism implies about the place of religious expression in the public schools and the 
boundaries of the nation’s civic culture. From the beginning, the common school was a religious institution. 
Though Catholics objected to Horace Mann’s notion of what Tyack has called “nonsectarian virtue,” neither 
Mann nor the other advocates of the common school were opposed to the expression of religious values in the 
schools. They surely did not think they were expelling God from the classroom. In fact, as James Fraser has 
recently pointed out, the idea of the common school was in its origins inseparable from a commitment to pan-
Protestant values.22 Yet the cases Binder describes demonstrate vividly how firmly educators today subscribe to 
the notion that religious expression — especially when it influences the core curriculum — has no legitimate 
place in the public schools. In the cases Binder studied, even many educators who were devout Protestants and 
otherwise voted for right-wing political candidates were adamant in their belief that creationism violated the 
principle of the separation of church and state — that including it in the curriculum would narrow the definition 
of common ground. Indeed, though it is not the ostensible subject of her book, the great paradox at the heart of 
her study is that an institution, which in its origins equated the common good in education with respect for 
Protestant principles and the exclusion of African Americans, seems to be less responsive to the values of 
evangelical Christians today than to the concerns of African Americans and other people of color who historically 
were excluded from it. 
Symbolic integration 
As far as we are aware, no historian of education has investigated this paradox. But from a historical perspective 
on curriculum development, it has important implications for the questions Tyack has posed about the 
capaciousness of public schooling to accommodate the nation’s ethnic and religious diversity. One implication is 
that students who are not Protestant are no longer subjected to Protestant religious values in public schools. 
Another is that religion no longer puts constraints on the teaching of science. Indeed, from the perspective of 
the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries, Binder’s case studies of creationist debates in the late 
twentieth century help us see that the current disputes about prayer, Bible reading, and evolution are not, as 
many on the religious right would have it, about the religious intolerance of public education. Rather, they are 
about the efforts of evangelical Protestants — unsuccessful to date — to tighten the circle of the we by restoring 
its boundaries to where they were prior to the push to broaden them through guaranteeing that no particular 
set of religious values would be favored in schools. 
In contrast to the religious right, people of color have sought not to circumscribe the circle of the we but to 
expand it. Both Zimmerman and Binder have documented the long history of opposition to these groups and the 
limited effects of their efforts. Yet, if the changes introduced in textbooks and the history curriculum have failed 
to sufficiently portray the depth of racial injustice or to jettison entirely a celebrationist rendering of the nation’s 
past, their accounts suggest that these changes have not been trivial. To the contrary, the increasing integration 
of African Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans into history texts and the rejection of the most blatant 
racialist biases in them indicate considerable success — nearly a sea change, despite their limitations, in relation 
to the racist and exclusionary pre-1960s books. The continuing protests of multiculturalists in the 1990s suggest 
that the shortcomings of history texts today have less to do with the absence of people of color in them than 
with their failure to decenter fully the experience of whites and elites.23 
This symbolic integration, however, does not mirror the social relations of schools. As texts have become more 
inclusive, schools, with judicial support, have become more segregated in recent years. The inequality of 
resources that accompanies segregation raises questions about the ability of schools that serve low-income 
students to afford the newer, costly history texts or, for that matter, to hire science teachers properly trained to 
teach evolution.24 And it suggests that perhaps the real victors in the culture wars are upper-middle-class whites 
who have superior access to a desegregated curriculum without facing any pressure to desegregate their schools 
or their resources.25 
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